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Abstract 
 
Contentious politics are on the rise, which urges us to question why ever more people decide 
to participate in them. Therefore, in this paper we bring an analysis of what makes protesters 
perceive their efforts as effective, and how this relates to the frequency of their participation. 
In doing so, we build on Klandermans’ value-expectancy theory, which holds that individuals 
are more likely to participate in protest if they perceive the effort of doing so as reasonably 
effective. In particular we analyze how perceiving politicians and public opinion as 
responsive to a particular political protest affects a protester’s estimation of the likelihood 
the protest will have its intended impact, and how this relates to the activist’s protest 
frequency. To do so, we present a case-study of the worldwide upsurge of demonstrations 
against the upcoming war against Iraq on February 15, 2003. Drawing on a survey of 5,572 
participants in eight countries we demonstrate that both perceiving public opinion and 
perceiving politicians as responsive has a positive effect on a protesters’ perception of the 
protest’s effectiveness. As to how the former relates to participants’ protest frequency we find 
only limited evidence. 
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Introduction  
 
Participation in social movements and political protest is on the rise (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 
2002; Kriesi et al., 2012; McAdam, 1996; Norris, 2002). This poses important questions 
about why people increasingly decide to participate in such contentious politics. One 
dominant explanation for individuals’ participation in contentious politics, the value-
expectancy theory, holds that the decision to abstain or participate is the result of an 
individual’s assessment of the costs and benefits of doing so (Klandermans, 1984, 1997; Opp, 
1989, 2009). In other words, “the more likely it is that a specific behaviour will produce a 
specific set of outcomes, and the more highly an individual values these outcomes, the more 
likely it is that he or she will engage in that behaviour” (Klandermans, 1997, p. 26). In this 
paper we build on this approach, as we argue we need to understand what makes activists 
perceive contentious politics as effective if we want to grasp why they decide to participate in 
it. Still, although it has often been demonstrated  that various political context factors external 
to a movement determine its political impact (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010), it has 
remained unclear how such factors affect participants’ perception of a movements’ 
effectiveness (Opp, 2009). In this paper we seek to address this gap in the literature. 
This paper investigates the relation between participants’ sense of political efficacy 
and their perception of two main factors determining a movement’s effectiveness: 1; the 
responsiveness of politicians and 2; the responsiveness of public opinion (Amenta et al., 
2010; Walgrave & Vliegenthart, 2012). On the one hand, the political opportunity structure 
approach to social movements stresses the importance of variations in the responsiveness of 
politicians for a movement’s success (Kriesi, 2004), and many have emphasized that 
perceiving that politicians are responsive to the movements’ demands is a crucial aspect of an 
individual’s sense of political efficacy (Balch, 1974; Coleman & Davis, 1976; Niemi, Craig, 
& Mattei, 1991). On the other hand, various authors have qualified this ‘direct-impact 
approach’ by instead arguing that the responsiveness of public opinion is the main 
determinant of a movement’s effectiveness, as only under the condition that a majority of the 
public supports the movement’s claims, will politicians be tempted to respond to those claims 
(Burstein, 1998; Giugni, 2006; Uba, 2009). Still, when inquiring participants’ sense of 
political efficacy, to our knowledge, no study has included participants’ perception of the 
responsiveness of politicians and of public opinion. Consequently, we know little about why 
participants’ would perceive participation as effective, and how their perceptions of 
effectiveness affect their propensity to participate, and moreover, how this affects them to do 
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so more frequently, or not. Therefore, the question that has remained unanswered is: How do 
protesters’ perceptions of the responsiveness of politicians and of public opinion affect their 
perception of a protest’s effectiveness, and how does this relate to the frequency with which 
they participate in political protest?  
In order to address these questions we analyze the worldwide eruption of protest 
against the invasion of Iraq in February 2003. As millions of people took the streets to oppose 
the upcoming war, these events constituted the largest peace protest in human history, 
representing a very complex interplay between protesters, public opinion, and government 
stances (Verhulst & Walgrave, 2010), which makes this case into a particularly interesting 
one for our purposes. Although public opinion has been found to be determinant for the 
successfulness various social movements (Uba, 2009), the peace movement has been found to 
be particularly dependent on influencing public opinion in order to establish an (indirect) 
impact on decision makers and policies (Marullo & Meyer, 2004), as the direct access to 
policy making is exceptionally limited for this movement (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & 
Giugni, 1995). The 2003 peace demonstrations were no exception to this rule, and this case 
therefore offers an excellent opportunity to address our research questions concerning the role 
of public opinion for protesters’ sense of efficacy. We will use data from the International 
Peace Protest Survey (IPPS,Walgrave et al., 2003), which was conducted in eight countries, 
containing data from 5,772 protesters. Using multivariate ordinary least squares regressions 
and generalized ordered logistic regressions, we analyze the relations between the different 
dimensions of perceiving protest as effective, and we relate those to the frequency of 
participation. Our results thereby contribute, first, to our understanding of the relative 
importance of the responsiveness of public opinion and politicians to protesters’ sense of 
efficacy, and second, to our comprehension of its impact on processes of mobilization. 
In what follows, we will first discuss the relevant literature on protest efficacy and on 
protesters’ subjective perception of effectiveness. Next, we will further elaborate on our case 
study. After that, we will report on our analyses and results, to finally conclude with a 
discussion of the theoretical implications of our findings.  
 
Political efficacy, political opportunity structures, and public opinion 
 
Political efficacy has often been reported to increase individuals’ propensity to become 
politically active (Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 2002), as it has been 
referred to as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact 
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upon the political process, (…) the feeling that political and social change is possible, and 
that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, & 
Miller, 1954, p. 187). This has been found to be particularly relevant for participation in non-
institutionalized forms of participation, like political protest (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & 
Young, 2011; Dalton, 2008; Gamson, 1968; Lee, 2010; Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010). 
According to the value-expectancy theory (hereafter VET) participation in social movements 
and political protest is motivated by individuals’ assessment of the costs and benefits of doing 
so, i.e. of their perception of protest efficacy (Klandermans, 1984, 1997; Opp, 1989, 2009), 
stressing that if individuals perceive protesting as effective, they are more likely to become 
mobilized (Finkel, Muller, & Opp, 1989; Finkel & Muller, 1989; Lee, 2010). The VET has 
been criticized for overlooking additionl motivations for participation (e.g. Polletta, 2004), 
however, taking into account this consideration, it is argued that activists can be expected to 
become active on the basis of instrumental and rational considerations at least to some extent 
(Opp, 2009). Thus, although the rational approach of VET surely cannot explain participation 
in contentious politics entirely, it does so in part, and it is therefore important to appreciate 
what makes participants perceive protest as effective in order to understand why they become 
active (Opp, 2009).  
Both the responsiveness of the political system and that of public opinion, or the 
extent to which either seriously considers and potentially supports the movements’ demands, 
have been found to be crucial factors in determining the effectiveness of collective action 
(Amenta et al., 2010; Walgrave & Vliegenthart, 2012). However, it has remained largely 
unstudied what the relative effect of each of these elements is for individuals’ perception of 
protest efficacy. Although some scholars have thus far inquired how activists perceive the 
POS and how this affects their political efficacy (Ergas, 2010; Hudalah, Winarso, & Woltjer, 
2010; Kurzman, 1996), to our knowledge, no study has addressed protesters’ perception of 
the responsiveness of public opinion and its relation to perceived protest efficacy. In effect, 
we are in need of a better understanding of the relation between these two frequently 
discussed external determinants of a movement’s impact – a responsive public opinion and 
responsive politicians – and individuals’ perceptions of  the latter.  
 First, the political process approach (McAdam, 1982) stresses the importance of the 
facilitative or repressive nature of the political opportunity structure (hereafter POS) in 
determining a movement’s success (e.g. Kriesi et al., 1995). Maintaining a strong focus on 
the state (for an overview see Meyer, 2004), this approach has emphasized that in more open 
POSs, politicians are more disposed to take into account social movements’ demands and that 
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therefore social movements are more likely to have an impact on public policy (e.g. Eisinger, 
1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1995; Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1989). As the 
openness of a POS might determine a movement’s success, individuals’ perception of the 
POS are likely to affect their cost-benefit calculation of participation, and hence, their 
propensity to become active (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Klandermans, 1997; Koopmans & 
Olzak, 2004; Kriesi et al., 1995; Opp, 2009; Tarrow, 2011). Thus, individuals who perceive 
the POS, and more concretely, politicians, as responsive to their demands, are expectedly 
more likely to feel efficacious, and to belief their actions could have an effect on public 
policy, making them more likely to participate (Finkel et al., 1989). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Protesters who more strongly believe that politicians are responsive to 
their demands are more likely to believe their efforts will result in policy change. 
 
At the same time, the POS approach has been criticized for its state-centered focus 
(Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, 2003; Snow, 2004; Young, 2002), as many have drawn attention 
to the importance of a responsive public opinion as a more important determinant of a 
movement’s success, underscoring its mediating role for social movements’ impact on 
politicians and public policy (Agnone, 2007; Burstein, 1985; Giugni, 2004, 2006; Schurman, 
2004; Soule & Olzak, 2004; Uba, 2009). That is to say, according to Burstein’s theory of 
democratic representation, instead of having a direct impact on public policy, social 
movements function merely as barometers for politicians’ assessment of public opinion 
(Burstein & Linton, 2002; Luders, 2006). Once signaled about a particular issue, politicians 
will consider whether or not, and how, to respond to the movements’ demands. A favorable 
public opinion is a crucial element in this consideration, as politicians are unlikely to conform 
to a movement’s demands if these are not supported by public opinion and might therefore 
damage them electorally (Burstein, 1998). In the absence of a favorable public opinion, it 
would therefore appear to be unlikely that social movements could affect public policy 
(Giugni, 2004, 2006; Shapiro, 2011). Hence, a movements’ ability to mobilize consensus 
within public opinion could well determine its impact on politicians and public policy 
(Klandermans, 1997; Santoro, 2008), and as a result, could determine activists’ perception of 
the movements’ efficacy (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004; Koopmans & Statham, 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Protesters who feel public opinion is responsive to their demands are 
more likely to believe that politicians will be responsive to their demands. 
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Hypothesis 3: Protesters who feel public opinion is responsive to their demands are 
more likely to believe their efforts will result in policy change. 
 
 It is questionable, however, whether public opinion has such an effect under all 
conditions. Several studies (McAdam & Su, 2002; Soule & King, 2006; Uba, 2009) show that 
social movements might benefit from a favorable public opinion, yet their direct impact on 
politicians and public policy is still significant when controlled for the impact of public 
opinion. These findings should not surprise us. As Uba states, “one should not just ask if the 
majority of the public supports or opposes the policy under question, but also examine the 
composition of this majority” (2009, p. 439). Even more, “on many issues, the public has no 
meaningful opinions” (Burstein, 2006, p. 2273), leaving ample leeway for organized 
interests, whereas a strong public opinion on a certain issue increases its electoral weight, 
potentially making politicians more hesitant to respond to the issue (Amenta et al., 2010; 
Giugni, 2004; Kriesi et al., 1995; Walgrave & Vliegenthart, 2012). Moreover, in more 
proportional systems where multipartyism prevails, politicians have a clear interest in 
representing political niches of the population (Kriesi et al., 1995; Lijphart, 2012). The strict 
focus on the majority of the public is a characteristic typically reserved for majoritarian 
systems (Lijphart, 2012; Powell, 2000). Hence, a favorable public opinion might under some 
circumstances be to the benefit of a social movements’  efforts, it is certainly not a sine qua 
non, which again stresses the relevance of politicians’ responsiveness to challengers. In that 
sense, we expect our findings to be in line with earlier work by Giugni (2004) who, with his 
joint-effect model, demonstrated that both a responsive public opinion and responsive 
politicians facilitate a movement’s impact. Hence, perceiving both public opinion and 
politicians as responsive will expectedly have a joint positive effect on protesters’ perception 
of a protest’s impact.  
 
Protest efficacy and the frequency of participation 
 
Thus, an individual’s perspective on the responsiveness of politicians and public opinion 
expectedly affects his or her perception of the protest’s effectiveness. According to the VET, 
this effect should present an incentive for individuals to participate in this form of political 
action more often (Finkel et al., 1989; Finkel & Muller, 1989; Klandermans, 1997; Opp, 
1989). Thus, if the perceived efficacy of protesting is highest among participants who feel 
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that politicians and/or public opinion are responsive to their claims, we would expect those 
people to participate in demonstrations more often. 
 Although many studies have found such a positive relation between political efficacy 
and levels of political participation (e.g. Lee, 2010; Schussman & Soule, 2005; Verba et al., 
2002), the causal direction of this relationship is sometimes discussed. As several authors 
have indicated, as much as a sense of efficacy might incite one to participate, the experience 
of participation might affect one’s sense of efficacy as well (Anderson, 2010; Finkel, 1985; 
Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Neal & 
Seeman, 1964; Quintelier & van Deth, n.d.). Having participated in a successful protest event 
is likely to increase one’s sense of political efficacy, whereas failure could potentially depress 
it. Moreover, participation might affect the cognitive basis of efficacy as well, as the social 
networks surrounding political action provide the “cognitive parameters that lead to choices 
such as participating in a social movement or abstaining from doing so” (Passy & Giugni, 
2001, p. 124). Still, political attitudes like efficacy have been found to be rather stable 
throughout adult life, indicating that the effect of experience on attitudes could also be 
limited (Aish & Jöreskog, 1990; Alwin & Krosnick, 1991). In conclusion, we will test the 
relation between the perceived responsiveness of the political system and public opinion and 
individuals’ frequency of participation in political protest, yet we stress the plausibility of a 
mutual effect between the two: efficacy affects one’s propensity to participate, and the 
experience of participation shapes one’s beliefs about the efficacy of protest. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Protesters who more strongly belief public opinion and/or politicians 
are responsive to their demands, participate in demonstrations more frequently than 
their more skeptic peers. 
 
The Case of the 2003 Anti-Iraq-war Demonstrations 
 
To test our four hypotheses we make use of the International Peace Protest Survey, which 
was conducted in eight countries
1
 during the worldwide protests against the Second Gulf War 
in 2003. These protests together constituted the largest protest event in human history:  
 
                                                          
1
 Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherland, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. 
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On Feb. 15, 2003, millions of people took to the streets in worldwide protests against 
an upcoming war in Iraq. Globally, about 10 million people demonstrated in at least 
600 cities throughout the world, in many countries breaking attendance records 
previously held by the early 1980s protests against nuclear armament (Walgrave & 
Verhulst, 2009, pp. 1358–9). 
 
Despite its wide dispersion, the protests were the result of one well-organized European 
peace movement, having a central organizational meeting in Florence in 2002, and 
coordinating claims and slogans even with their US counterparts of United for Peace and 
Justice (Verhulst, 2010; Walgrave & Verhulst, 2009). As argued above, this case is 
particularly interesting to our current investigation, since it concerns a movement that 
depends on the responsiveness of public opinion to an exceptional extent, both in general 
(Kriesi et al., 1995; Marullo & Meyer, 2004), and in this particular case (Verhulst & 
Walgrave, 2010). Public opinion, however, does not decide over war and peace, politicians 
do, making protesters dependent of the responsiveness of politicians as well. Thus, as 82.5 
percent of the protesters claimed to participate to promote ‘instrumental goals’ (Walgrave, 
Van Laer, Verhulst, & Wouters, 2010)
2
, both the responsiveness of public opinion and of 
politicians confined the extent to which the goals of this peace movement could potentially be 
achieved, expectedly determining the protesters’ sense of the protest’s efficacy. Thus, not 
only is our case a historical manifestation of one of the most emblematic social movements of 
the last decades (Della Porta & Diani, 2006), it offers a typical case of an interplay between 
protesters, public opinion and politicians as well. This case is therefore well suited for 
addressing our hypotheses about what determines protesters’ sense of efficacy. An important 
consideration concerning the case selection, however, is that as matters of government 
responsiveness and public opinion are highly issue specific (Kriesi et al., 1995; Van Dyke, 
Soule, & Taylor, 2004), the validity of our findings do not necessarily transcend the peace 
movement. Hence, generalizations of our findings should be made only with this reservation 
in mind. 
                                                          
2
 According to Walgrave et al. (2010, pp. 4, 5), “applied to protest, an instrumental motive draws upon the 
potential later effect of the protest. Rewards are postponed, returns of investments are delayed. Instrumental 
motivation implies that not the act itself is motivating but the thing the act may bring about”, which in this case 
would be the prevention of a war. Both affecting public opinion and politicians were mentioned as means to 
attain this goal. These findings are in line with a more general assessment of protesters’ motivation, as Verba et 
al. (Verba et al., 2002, p. 115) found that 80 percent of the protesters in their survey became active on the basis 
of instrumental motivations. 
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 The 2003 anti-Iraq-war protests were recorded on a unique scale. On the day of the 
protests, at 11 demonstrations in eight countries a postal survey was handed over to, and 
completed and sent back by 5,772 protesters
3. The sample’s randomization was guaranteed 
using a fieldwork method developed by Norris, Van Aelst and Walgrave (Norris, Walgrave, 
& Van Aelst, 2005; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001), which prescribes that questionnaires are 
systematically handed over to every Nth person in every Nth row of the crowd. Although the 
response rate of the postal survey was limited to 53 percent, the postal survey demonstrates 
similar marginal distributions as some 991 face-to-face interviews of which the random 
sample can be guaranteed by a near total response rate. We can therefore be confident that the 
postal survey represents the responses of a random sample as well (Walgrave & Verhulst, 
2009). 
 
Variables  
 
To test our first three hypotheses we want to know how participants perceive the 
responsiveness of politicians and public opinion, as well as how they perceive the 
instrumental impact the demonstration might have. First, participants’ perception of the 
responsiveness of politicians and of public opinion were tapped by asking them about the 
extent to which they agreed with the following two statements: “politicians will take into 
account our demands” and “the demonstration will raise the understanding of the public 
opinion”. A scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree) was used to record the 
answers. On the same scale protesters were asked to what extent they agreed with the 
following statement: “the demonstration raises the chance a war can be prevented”, which 
constituted not the only, but certainly the most important instrumental goal of the protest 
(Klandermans, 2010), and which will therefore be used as indicator of participants’ perceived 
protest efficacy. To measure protest frequency, protesters were asked how often they had 
participated in demonstrations in the prior five years. Answers were given on a scale ranging 
from 1 (first time) to 5 (more than 20 times). 
 
Control variables 
  
                                                          
3
 In fact, 6,753 protesters completed a survey, however, this includes 991 respondents who completed a face-to-
face survey instead of a mail survey. Although the marginal distributions from this survey matched that of the 
mail survey, we exclude these respondents from out analyses to prevent any potential bias stemming from 
survey mode effects. 
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As the perception of a responsive public opinion and political system could be seen as 
subcategories of a more general feeling of political efficacy, we will control for political 
efficacy in all of our models. To do so we will include a scale of eight items (see appendix), 
each tapping in on different aspects of this attitude. A Cronbach’s alpha of .80 guarantees the 
reliability of the scale. Moreover, education, age and gender have been found to be important 
determinants of political efficacy (Blais & Rubenson, 2013; Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 
2001; Niemi et al., 1991) and therefore these will be included as control variables in the 
models as well. 
 Finally, as outlined above, we hypothesize that there is a relation between an 
individual’s  perception of the responsiveness of politicians and his or her estimation of the 
chance the demonstration will prevent the war. One might argue that this assumption makes 
sense only for people who actually intend to prevent the war by addressing politicians. 
Unfortunately, we have no data about who respondents perceived as the main addressees of 
their efforts. However, we do know to what extent respondents were satisfied with their 
government’s efforts to prevent the invasion of Iraq. We argue that respondents who were 
dissatisfied with their government’s efforts to prevent the war were likely to have – at least to 
some extent – directed their actions at those governments, expressing their concerns about the 
behavior of the respective government. Thus, respondents were asked whether they were 
satisfied with their government’s efforts to prevent the war, giving answers on a scale 
reaching from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). This we will use as a control variable 
when testing the respective hypothesis. 
 
Models and Results 
 
In this section we discuss our findings and their implications for our hypotheses. Before 
turning to our models, however, it is useful to take a look at the marginal distributions of our 
main dependent and independent variables (perceived responsiveness of public opinion, 
perceived responsiveness of politicians and perceived chance a war can be prevented, Figure 
1), as these descriptives already give us some idea about the general sense of efficacy among 
the protesters. They show us that in general, there is a strong tendency towards the approving 
categories, indicating that on average, the protesters felt relatively efficacious about their 
participation in the events. What is striking, however, is that most demonstrators perceived 
public opinion as far more responsive (with an average of 4.21) than the political system 
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(3.29 average). Moreover, most protesters felt that the demonstration could in fact raise the 
chance that the invasion of Iraq could be prevented. 
 
Figure 1: Descriptives of variables 
 
 
Perceiving protest efficacy 
 
As theorized above, we expect that these different dimensions of protest efficacy are 
interrelated. More specifically, we assume that protesters who belief public opinion and 
politicians are responsive to their demands, will have a stronger belief that a war can be 
prevented. To test this assumption, we use an ordinary least squares regression with robust 
standard errors clustered per country. We cluster standard errors per country as various 
authors have stressed the importance of variations in countries’ POSs, and its implications for 
citizens’ perception of protest efficacy (Beyeler & Rucht, 2010; Kriesi et al., 1995; Lijphart, 
2012; Norris, 2008). Moreover, some countries in our sample in fact opposed the war against 
Iraq. It can be expected that this affects their perception of the protests potential impact. As 
respondents’ answers may thus be correlated within countries, we expect potential problems 
with the normal distribution of residuals. Clustering robust standard errors per country 
prevents this problem. 
 Table 1 demonstrates that, as expected, both respondents’ beliefs in responsive 
politicians, and respondents’ beliefs in a responsive public opinion have a positive impact on 
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Demo will raise understanding 
public opinion (N=5,549. 
X̅=4.21. S=.82) 
Politicians will take into account 
our demands (N=5486 X̅=3.29. 
S=1.02) 
Demo raises the chance a war can 
be prevented (N=5576. X̅=3.56. 
S=1.05) 
12 
 
believing a war can be prevented as a result of the demonstration, confirming hypotheses 1 
and 3. Moreover, considering the R
2
 of 29 percent, this model explains a good amount of the 
variance in respondents’ confidence in preventing a war. Yet what is striking, is that the 
effect of believing politicians can be affected has a much stronger effect, and is significant 
still at the 0.1 percent level, unlike the belief in a responsive public opinion (p<.05). Thus, 
although these findings confirm both hypotheses 1 and 3, it is clear that believing politicians 
will be responsive outweighs that concerning public opinion.  
 
Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares Regression  
       Demo raises the chance a 
war can be prevented 
 
 
Intercept 
 
1.313*** (.159) 
 
   
Gender -.003 (.018)  
Age .007* (.002)  
Level of education -.026* (.009)  
Political efficacy .022 (.016)  
Satisfaction with government efforts to prevent war .010 (.011)  
   
Demo will raise understanding public opinion .096* (.037)  
Politicians will take into account our demands 
 
.521*** (.018)  
N=4500. R
2
= .29.    
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Clustered robust standard errors for countries between brackets. 
 
The limited effect of perceiving public opinion as responsive should not surprise us, however, 
as mobilizing consent within public opinion is argued to have an indirect, rather than a direct 
impact on government policy. That is to say, as protesters might affect public opinion, they 
incite politicians to concur to their demands as to prevent electoral losses (Burstein & Linton, 
2002; Giugni, 2004). Hence, as formulated in our second hypothesis, we expect that 
protesters who perceive public opinion as more responsive will have an increased belief in 
politicians’ responsiveness to their demands. To model this assumption, we again make use 
of an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors clustered per country. The 
results are presented in Table 2 and confirm that believing public opinion can be influenced 
increases one’s belief that politicians will be responsive to the protesters’ demands. As 
believing politicians will be responsive increases one’s belief that a war can be prevented, 
these findings jointly support the idea of an indirect effect of perceiving public opinion as 
responsive. In sum, our findings confirm our first three hypotheses by demonstrating that 
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perceiving politicians and public opinion as responsive increases individuals’ perceived 
protest efficacy, whether in a direct or in an indirect way. 
 
Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regression  
       Politicians will take into 
account our demands 
 
 
Intercept 
 
1.851*** (.244) 
 
   
Gender -.003 (.026)  
Age .010** (.028)  
Level of education -.052 (.028)  
Political efficacy .223** (.037)  
   
Demo will raise understanding public opinion 
 
.159** (.039)  
N=4569. R
2
= .10.    
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Clustered robust standard errors for countries between brackets. 
 
Protest frequency 
 
These findings bring us to our next hypothesis, namely that, as the VET holds, people who 
expect protesting to be effective are more likely to participate, and to do so more often 
(Klandermans, 1997; Opp, 2009). Yet, as outlined above, there are different perspectives on 
what constitutes an ‘effective’ protest, as some assume social movements affect politicians 
directly (e.g. Kriesi et al., 1995), whereas others assume this effect can only be achieved 
through affecting public opinion first (e.g. Burstein & Linton, 2002). Moreover, our findings 
so far indicate that both the perceived responsiveness of politicians and of public opinion 
significantly increase respondents’ perception of protest efficacy. It can therefore be expected 
that both have a positive relation with one’s propensity to participate in protest actions.  
To test this assumption we make use of a generalized ordered logistic regression from 
Stata’s gologit2 program (Williams, 2006). As the dependent variable, protest frequency, is a 
categorical variable with an uneven distribution of categories, an ordered logistic regression 
is the pertinent method to model this relationship. However, in testing our statistical 
assumptions we obtained a significant Brant-test, indicating a violation of the parallel 
regression assumption. This means that the coefficients describing the relationship between 
the different pairs of outcome groups are not parallel. Therefore, it would be impossible to 
interpret the single set of coefficients that an ordered logistic regression would normally 
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generate. Instead, we need different coefficients for each of the relations between pairs of 
outcome groups. A generalized ordered logistic regression offers this possibility. Hence, 
Table 3 shows odds ratios that indicate the chance that a respondent would be in one of the 
higher categories of the dependent variable – protest frequency – in case of an increase of one 
unit of the explanatory variable.  
 First of all, it needs to be noted that on the basis of this model we are not able to 
explain a great deal of the variance of the dependent variable, witness the fact that the pseudo 
R
2
 is only .02. However, despite relaxing the parallel regression assumption, we see a fairly 
steady pattern: We find almost no significant effect of believing politicians will be 
influenced, except for a negative effect on the odds that someone will have protested more 
than 20 times in the past five years. Quite to the contrary, believing public opinion will be 
influenced by the demonstration in all cases raises the chance that a respondent is in a higher 
category of protest frequency. For instance, an increase of one unit in believing that public 
opinion will be responsive increases the chance that someone had already demonstrated more 
than five times before with 18 percent. 
According to the VET, the positive relation between perceiving public opinion as 
responsive and one’s protest frequency could be explained as the positive effect of the former 
on the outcome of the cost-benefit calculation of whether or not to participate. In other words, 
people who believe public opinion, and consequently, public policy will be altered as a result 
of their activism are more likely to partake in such action than someone who is unconvinced 
about such effects. It remains unclear, however, why this is not the case for someone who 
beliefs he or she is able to affect politicians through protesting, as this should, according to 
the VET’s logic, have a positive effect on one’s cost-benefit calculation as well. An 
alternative explanation would therefore be that more experienced protesters have different 
perspectives on the effects of protesting than less experienced peers. Out of experience the 
respondent may have learned that public opinion is responsive to their actions, and that 
politicians are not. As discussed above, however, we have no empirical or theoretical basis to 
make assumptions about causal directions. It is clear, however, that protesters who perceive 
public opinion as being responsive, are those who protest more often. 
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Table 3: Generalized ordered logistic regression indicating odds ratios 
        Protest frequency  
    
First time Intercept 
 
1.268 (.725)  
 Age .994 (.005)  
 Gender .916 (.072)  
 Level of education 1.053 (.047)  
 Political efficacy 
 
.821 (.122)  
 Demo will raise understanding public opinion 1.236** (.077)  
 Politicians will take into account our demands 
 
.946 (.048)  
2-5 times Intercept 
 
.464 (.308)  
 Age .996 (.004)  
 Gender .745 (.042)  
 Level of education .965 (.031)  
 Political efficacy 
 
.720*** (.067)  
 Demo will raise understanding public opinion 1.180** (.062)  
 Politicians will take into account our demands 
 
.995 (.070)  
6-10 
times 
Intercept 
 
.253 (.199)  
 Age .997 (.004)  
 Gender .670*** (.044)  
 Level of education .972 (.037)  
 Political efficacy 
 
.712*** (.065)  
 Demo will raise understanding public opinion 1.163* (.082)      
 Politicians will take into account our demands 
 
.965 (.086)  
11-20 
times 
Intercept .1.158* (.083)  
 Age 1.002 (.006)  
 Gender .586*** (.049)  
 Level of education .974 (.062)  
 Political efficacy 
 
.731** (.073)  
 Demo will raise understanding public opinion 1.158* (.083)  
 Politicians will take into account our demands 
 
.917* (.035)  
N=4549. Pseudo R
2
=.02  
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Clustered robust standard errors for countries between brackets. 
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Conclusion 
 
According to the value-expectancy theory (Klandermans, 1997; Opp, 2009), to understand 
processes of mobilization, it is crucial to understand what causes individuals to perceive 
participation as effective, as this incites them to become politically active. Both the 
responsiveness of public opinion and of politicians have been argued to be crucial factors for 
determining a movements’ effectiveness (Amenta et al., 2010). In effect, in this paper we 
have inquired how perceiving the responsiveness of public opinion and of politicians affects 
the perceived protest efficacy of participants in the 2003 global demonstrations against the 
invasion of Iraq, and how this relates to their frequency of protest participation. 
 First, we found that there is indeed a positive relation between believing that public 
opinion and politicians are responsive to protesters’ demands and the sense that their 
instrumental goal, in this case the prevention of a war, can be achieved. However, believing 
politicians are responsive has a much stronger effect than believing public opinion is 
responsive. This can be explained by the notion that social movements have an indirect effect 
on public policy through affecting politicians. Indeed, we find that a belief in a responsive 
public opinion has an indirect effect on protest efficacy, as it increases one’s belief that 
politicians can be affected. Second, we tested the assumption from VET that those who feel 
that public opinion or politicians are responsive to their efforts are likely to participate more 
often, as they have a stronger belief in the protests’ impact. We indeed find such a relation, 
yet exclusively so for the perception of a responsive public opinion. It remains unclear, 
however, whether one’s belief in a responsive public opinion increases one’s propensity to 
participate, or whether the experience of participation teaches one that public opinion is 
responsive, unlike politicians. 
 Although our findings are limited to the peace movement, we belief they constitute an 
important contribution to our understanding of why individuals participate in political protest, 
underscoring the importance of protesters’ perception of the responsiveness of both public 
opinion and of politicians. As a result, these findings challenge the state-centered approach 
that has been dominant within the literature on political efficacy (e.g. Niemi et al., 1991), 
wherein it is assumed that individuals will feel more efficacious if they believe politicians are 
prepared to take into account their considerations. Our findings support this assumption, 
however, in addition they suggest that perceiving public opinion as responsive has a similar, 
yet smaller, effect on one’s political efficacy. To further qualify these findings, and to further 
increase our understanding of what makes protesters perceive protest as effective, future 
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research should include respondents’ perception of additional external determinants of a 
movements’ success, such as economic or cultural factors (Wahlstrom & Peterson, 2006), as 
this would further increase our understanding of the origins of political efficacy. 
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Appendix 
 
Table I: Principal Component Analysis including Ten Efficacy Variables 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
There is no use in voting .68  
Politicians only make promises .72  
I admire the organization of our political system .62  
There are a lot of secrets in politics .51  
People do influence governments .63  
Parties are only interested in my vote, not my opinion .70  
Politics is too complicated  .79 
Most politicians are competent people .60  
Our opinions are taken into account by politicians .69  
I am not better informed about politics than others  .73 
Eigenvalue 3.42 1.30 
Note: Cronbach’s Alpha factor 1 = 0.80. Source: IPPS 2003. N = 4,886 
 
